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Edsel L. Beja, Jr.
External debt is an important concern to Southeast Asian countries. In the 1990s, for instance, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Th   ailand became vulnerable to debt-related crises, and experienced large-scale 
capital ﬂ  ight, especially in the late 1990s. But recent evidence shows that capital ﬂ  ight had already been 
signiﬁ  cant in the region earlier on, even during the 1980s (Beja, 2006a).
In this paper, the linkages between external borrowing and capital ﬂ  ight are analyzed using a revolv-
ing door model. Brieﬂ  y, this model posits direct and indirect linkages between external debt and capital 
ﬂ  ight. Th  e  ﬁ  rst type of linkage posits a direct causal eﬀ  ect, whereby external debt provides the fuel and/or 
motivation for capital ﬂ  ight, and vice versa. Th   us, external borrowings are transformed—sometimes instan-
taneously from capital inﬂ  ow to capital ﬂ  ight, ultimately ending up abroad, usually in a private foreign ac-
count. At the same time, external debts accumulate, so that the mounting burden of debt servicing—and the 
possibility of a debt crisis—signal increased risk, thus providing a motivation for capital ﬂ  ight. Th  e  causality 
can run in the reverse direction as well. For example, as capital ﬂ  ees, it creates a ﬁ  nancial vacuum, and the 
country, in turn, seeks external resources to ﬁ  ll the void. Or, in the case of ﬂ  ight-fueled external borrowing, 
money sent abroad is borrowed back. Th   is may be motivated, for example, by a desire to disguise the origin 
of funds, or to beneﬁ  t from government guarantees against default. Th   e overall result is a revolving process of 
capital ﬂ  ight and debt accumulation. 
In contrast, the second type of linkage—an indirect linkage—posits that capital ﬂ  ight and external 
borrowing occur because of overlapping sets of exogenous factors, but are not causally linked to each other. 
Th   us, macroeconomic mismanagement results in both capital ﬂ  ight and external borrowing, but the lat-
ter does not cause the former, nor vice versa. Th   e analysis presented in this paper conﬁ  rms a revolving door 
process, linking capital inﬂ  ows, capital ﬂ  ight, and debt accumulation.
The concept of capital ﬂ  ight
Capital ﬂ  ight is not a new issue. Studies have documented capital ﬂ  ight from Europe and the United States 
in the early twentieth century and, in the case of Europe, during the seventeenth century or even earlier (see, 
e.g., Kindleberger, 1987). In the 1930s, and later after World War II, concerns about capital ﬂ  ight from 
Europe to the United States became the subject of debates at the Bretton Woods meetings (Helleiner, 1994). 
Even in recent decades, studies have documented capital ﬂ  ight from some Organization of Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries (see, e.g., Gibson and Tskalotos, 1993)—which is evidence 
that capital ﬂ  ight aﬀ  ects the developed world, too.
But, today, capital ﬂ  ight is a particularly important concern for developing countries for at least 
three reasons, the ﬁ  rst being capital scarcity.1 Basically, capital ﬂ  ight aggravates the capital scarcity problem, 
1  “Capital scarcity” means the lack of ﬁ  nancial resources and infrastructural underdevelopment. Infrastructure refers to 
both physical (e.g., machines and transportation, communication, utilities) as well as social (e.g., education, health and 
public services, legal framework and institutions of ﬁ  nancial and labour markets) capital. A country with a low level of 
infrastructural development can thus be called capital scarce. It is constrained in attracting capital or will be unable to 
fully exploit the potential of additional resources; hence it will likely remain a capital scarce country. 2  DESA Working Paper No. 16
but more importantly, it restricts the capacity and ability of the aﬀ  ected country to mobilize its domestic as-
sets and access foreign resources. Consequently, capital ﬂ  ight retards economic growth and development and 
contributes to underdevelopment.
A second reason is the ability of capital ﬂ  ight to induce a negative feedback process, especially dur-
ing periods of crisis and uncertainty. As resource constraints become binding, economic growth is further 
limited. Th   en more capital ﬂ  ight could occur. Th   ere is also the possibility of being cut oﬀ   from external 
sources of funds. Consequently, it becomes more diﬃ   cult to implement economic policies, and improving 
the social conditions of people also becomes more diﬃ   cult. 
A third reason is economic justice, particularly the distributive impacts of external indebtedness and 
capital ﬁ  ght, and the legitimacy of external debts. When the elite squander external debts, or external bor-
rowings are inappropriately used to beneﬁ  t only a few, it is the rest of society that suﬀ  ers. More importantly, 
the economic and social costs of external indebtedness and capital ﬂ  ight are imposed on the majority. In ad-
dition, capital ﬂ  ight represents lost resources that could have been utilized in the domestic economy to gen-
erate additional output and jobs. Th   us, ultimately, it represents lost opportunities. Th   erefore, when society as 
a whole does not beneﬁ  t from external debts, questioning the legitimacy of such debts and the rationale for 
continuing to honour them becomes imperative. 
Th   e recent interest in capital ﬂ  ight was triggered by the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s. Th  e 
two foci of research were then as follows: scholars seeking to understand the relationship between capital 
ﬂ  ight and external debt, as capital ﬂ  ight undermined the ability of highly indebted countries to repay or 
service their mounting external debts (Lessard and Williamson, 1987); and scholars wanting to examine 
whether or not external borrowing in fact propels capital ﬂ  ight, and vice versa (Boyce, 1992).
After the debt crisis of the 1980s, capital ﬂ  ight became less of an issue, and capital started to ﬂ  ow 
back to developing countries, with the possible exception of Africa (see, e.g., Boyce and Ndikumana, 2001; 
Collier et al., 2001). Th   us scholars stopped paying attention to capital ﬂ  ight. By the latter half of the 1990s, 
however, there was a resurgence of capital ﬂ  ight, as developing countries faced a greater number of intense 
ﬁ  nancial and economic crises, making scholars interested in re-examining the issues.
At least three arguments point to the need to study capital ﬂ  ight again. As in the past, external debts 
constitute the ﬁ  rst reason. Country indebtedness remains a problem for developing countries, including 
the four Southeast Asian countries we study (Table 1). Indeed, recent experience suggests that developing 
countries are again becoming vulnerable to debt-related crises. Leung (2003), for example, presents empirical 
evidence that the increased indebtedness of developing countries is positively linked to the increased inten-
sity and frequency of debt-related economic cycles, a problem especially signiﬁ  cant in Africa and, to some 
extent, in Asia. Th   e 1997–1998 Asian crises, for instance, were partly rooted in the accumulation of external 
debts, although they were private external debts.
Th   e second reason relates to changes in the economic policies adopted by or, in some cases, forced 
upon developing countries. In particular, neoliberal policies led to wide-scale and aggressive deregulation and 
ﬁ  nancial liberalization without ensuring, or in some cases, neglecting the provision of appropriate gover-
nance structures and administrative capacity. Consequently, the economic environment has become more 
vulnerable to ﬁ  nancial swings, crashes, crises, contagions, and economic stagnation. In fact, some scholars 
have argued that ﬁ  nancial and economic crises are inevitable under such conditions (see, e.g., Palma, 2003), Revisiting the Revolving Door: Capital Flight from Southeast Asia  3
and moreover, they become more frequent (see, e.g., Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) and can lead to capital 
ﬂ  ight (see, e.g., Beja, Junvith and Ragusett, 2005). Th   e longer a country is in such a situation, and also the 
longer it postpones the re-introduction of governance structures and administrative capacity, the greater are 
the chances that ﬁ  nancial and economic crises will occur. Also, when crises occur, they will be more intense 
and their social and economic costs will be very signiﬁ  cant. Neoliberal policies have therefore made devel-
oping countries even more vulnerable to capital ﬂ  ight. Furthermore, given these developments, large and 
volatile capital ﬂ  ights will be common occurrences. 
A related issue in the context of the neoliberalization, especially ﬁ  nancial liberalization and global-
ization, concerns the use of capital ﬂ  ight as a weapon against the policies of developing country governments 
that threaten, so to speak, the prerogatives of the elites and the powerful in their use of capital and resources. 
In this context, capital ﬂ  ight can be seen as a capital threat that would go on strike against any form of 
government intervention to manage capital and resources, say, into productive endeavours to beneﬁ  t society 
at large in the long term. Th   us, to what extent ﬁ  nancial liberalization undermines the government’s policy 
space, or strengthens the capital threat, are critical dimensions to capital ﬂ  ight. What if the government 
simply wants to lower interest rates, target credit provisions, and so on, in order to realize full employment 
and raise social welfare? What if the government regulates capital ﬂ  ows to address external vulnerability and 
stabilize economic growth? In this context, capital ﬂ  ight necessarily includes a dimension of political econo-
my, of class conﬂ  ict, and concerns the State as a whole.
A third reason for reconsideration is that capital ﬂ  ight means lost resources to the domestic econo-
my, and therefore, lost opportunities. It is paradoxical that resources are ﬂ  owing out of developing countries 
rather than to them, although it is in developing countries that resources are most needed to generate eco-
nomic growth and development. Even very poor countries have become net lenders to the rest of the world 
(see, e.g., Boyce and Ndikumana, 2001). Such lost resources do not contribute to the expansion of domestic 
economic activities or to the improvement of the social welfare of domestic residents. On the contrary, they 
imply foregone goods and services essential to sustaining economic growth (see, e.g., Beja, 2006b).
Moreover, capital ﬂ  ight can also mean lost resources for debt servicing, thus making the social 
burden of external debt heavier. Since in the developing countries institutions are weak, fragile or missing, 
the social and economic costs can be large and can aﬀ  ect many in society. And because capital ﬂ  ight is often 
undertaken by the elite, the rest of society carries a disproportionate burden of the external debt. In fact, the 
elite are often able to avoid these costs because they are able to transfer their wealth abroad.
Table 1.
Share of total external debt to GDP by region, 1970–2002
Region 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Asia 0.21 0.29 0.38 0.47
Indonesia 0.47 0.27 0.61 0.93
Malaysia 0.12 0.27 0.35 0.47
Philippines 0.33 0.54 0.69 0.67
Thailand 0.14 0.26 0.33 0.65
Latin America 0.21 0.35 0.60 0.47
Africa 0.19 0.42 0.83 1.05
Note: Figures are based on World Bank (2004).4  DESA Working Paper No. 16
Th   e interest in capital ﬂ  ight stems from both old and new issues. Th   e lessons from the past remain 
very relevant to the current context, but because of the new dimensions to the same problem, new lessons 
have to be learned. Hopefully, this paper contributes to that end. 
Another point of clariﬁ  cation before we continue with the discussion concerns the diﬀ  erence be-
tween normal capital ﬂ  ow and capital ﬂ  ight. Capital ﬂ  ight is a type of capital ﬂ  ow, and they have a common 
feature: both are movements of capital across countries. But the similarity stops there. Capital ﬂ  ows represent 
portfolio decisions typically undertaken to exploit favourable returns to capital, among other advantages. 
Capital ﬂ  ight, on the other hand, represents a decision to take capital out and take refuge in another country 
in order to avoid social controls.
Furthermore, normal capital ﬂ  ows are like two-way streets, where the traﬃ   c of capital goes in both 
directions and is presumably recorded in oﬃ   cial statistics (i.e., balance of payments). Capital ﬂ  ight, in con-
trast, is more like a one-way street, in which the traﬃ   c of capital is moving out and typically remains unre-
corded. Sometimes, capital ﬂ  ight is ﬁ  nanced by capital inﬂ  ows, such as external debts. At other times, capital 
ﬂ  ight itself ﬁ  nances the capital inﬂ  ows, returning in the guise of foreign investments to avail of the incentives 
extended to overseas investors. Hence, it is possible to have large volumes of capital ﬂ  ows across countries 
without any capital ﬂ  ight involved. It is also possible that even without capital inﬂ  ows to a country, there are 
still huge amounts of capital ﬂ  ight. 
Lastly, when this capital ﬂ  ow perspective is employed, there is at the outset a problem in under-
standing capital ﬂ  ight: basically, the notion of an optimal portfolio allocation of capital precludes any 
unrecorded capital ﬂ  ows. In fact, in a two-way street capital ﬂ  ow system, there should not be any unrecorded 
ﬂ  ows, especially when the environment has been deregulated and ﬁ  nancially liberalized. Any movement of 
capital, no matter what the purpose, is considered legitimate and normal. If there are unrecorded capital 
ﬂ  ows, they are to be considered integral to the system and, whatever the outcome—including adverse im-
pacts on the country—it is presumed to be an optimal situation that market processes can correct.
Clearly, such a perspective ignores, and indeed does not see, the social and economic impacts of 
capital ﬂ  ight. We argue that these impacts can be signiﬁ  cant, are shouldered by the majority in society (i.e. 
the non-elite, or the poor), and long lasting. Th   erefore, while both capital outﬂ  ow and capital ﬂ  ight share 
a common feature, capital ﬂ  ight, in fact, has unique characteristics. Th   us, it may be that aﬀ  ected countries 
should take up policies that address capital ﬂ  ows in general but, at the same time, include policies that ad-
dress capital ﬂ  ight itself.
Deﬁ  ning and measuring capital ﬂ  ight
“Capital ﬂ  ight” is the movement of capital from a resource-scarce developing country to avoid social con-
trol.2 “It is measured as net unrecorded capital outﬂ  ow or the residual between oﬃ   cially recorded sources 
and recorded uses of funds. Th   e recorded sources of funds are net additions to external debt (CDET) and 
net non-debt capital inﬂ  ows (NKI). NKI is the sum of net direct foreign investments (FDI) and net portfo-
2 Th   ere are various deﬁ  nitions of capital ﬂ  ight (see, e.g., Beja, 2005). In this paper, “capital ﬂ  ight” is the movement of 
capital and resources in order to avoid social controls. “Social control” refers to actual or potential, formal and informal 
regulations on capital, covering societal norms and expectations on the use of foreign exchange, the extralegal or non-
governmental exactions on the use of resources, government taxation, as well as the government’s capacity to direct 
resources into productive endeavours engendering economic growth, which can be extended or reduced depending on 
the circumstances. As such, capital ﬂ  ight can be a movement of funds to avoid losses in the principal, or losses in the 
returns, or loss of control over one’s personal wealth or assets.Revisiting the Revolving Door: Capital Flight from Southeast Asia  5
lio equity investment plus other investment assets (PORT). Th   e recorded uses of funds are current account 
deﬁ  cits (CAD) and net accumulation of international reserves (CRES). Note that “net” means accounting all 
the inﬂ  ows and outﬂ  ows of funds. Th  us,
KF = CDET + NKI – CAD – CRES,            (1a)
which is called baseline capital ﬂ  ight (BKF). Positive BKF means capital ﬂ  ight; negative BKF means “reverse” 
capital ﬂ  ight. Th   is paper also follows the convention in the literature  by which capital ﬂ  ight is denoted with 
a positive notation, because capital ﬂ  ight is a form of foreign private assets accumulation. Th  us  “reverse” 
capital ﬂ  ight is like reducing foreign private assets, thus a negative notation. Note further that because the 
right hand side of Equation 1a contains variables that are considered oﬃ   cially recorded transactions, positive 
BKF implies net unrecorded capital outﬂ  ows and negative BKF, net unrecorded capital inﬂ  ows. 
Data used in the calculation have errors, so adjustments are needed to correct for them. Th  e  ﬁ  rst 
set of adjustments concerns the ﬁ  nancial accounts. An adjustment is needed for the impact of exchange 
rate ﬂ  uctuations on the stock of external debt (DEBT). Long-term external debts (LTDEBT) are normally 
denominated in a mix of hard currencies, and their ﬂ  uctuations will aﬀ  ect the US dollar (US$) values of 
LTDEBT, which will have implications on CDET. So the beginning-of-year adjusted external debt (ATTD) 
that accounts for foreign exchange rate ﬂ  uctuations can be obtained as
ATTD-1 = Σ [( αi, t-1 LTDEBT-1 ) ( FXi / FXi,-1 )] + Σ ( βi,-1 LTDEBT-1 )
           i=EU, UK, FF, DM, Yen, SF       i=USD, MULT, OTHER
+ IMF-1( SDRt / SDR-1 ) + STDEBT-1,        ( 2 )
where αi is the proportion of LTDEBT in Euros (EU), British pounds (UK), French francs (FF), German 
marks (DM), Japanese yens (Yen), and Swiss francs (SF); βi is the proportion of LTDEBT in USD, multiple 
and other currencies; FX is the exchange rate of the hard currencies to USD; IMF is use of IMF credits; SDR 
is the exchange rate between Special Drawing Rights and USD; STDEBT is short-term external debt. Th  e 
subscript -1 denotes the end of the last year (and hence, the beginning of the current year). Data for the cur-
rency composition of MULT, OTHER, and STDEBT are however not available, and their dollar valuations 
are unadjusted. All things the same, an appreciation in a hard currency relative to US$ reduces FXi/FXi,-1 and 
ATTD-1, so DEBT should be lower. With Equation 2, the adjustment factor for the impact of exchange rate 
ﬂ  uctuations on the stock of external debt (ADEBT) is
ADEBT = ATTD-1 – DEBT-1                    (3)
Equation 3 gives an estimate on the extent to which DEBT was impacted by foreign exchange ﬂ  uctuations. 
For instance, if the Japanese yen appreciated relative to USD, all others the same, we expect to have a lower 
ATTD-1 and ADEBT is negative. Th   erefore CDET would not be an accurate estimate of the net inﬂ  ow 
of new borrowing. Accordingly, we calculate the change in the adjusted external debt (CDETADJ). Using 
Equation 3, we subtract ADEBT from CDET, 
CDETADJ = CDET – ADEBT.                 (4a)6  DESA Working Paper No. 16
Since CDET = DEBT – DEBT-1, it can be shown that Equation 4a is equal to
CDETADJ = DEBT – ATTD-1.        (4b)
Equation 1a can be re-calculated to obtain an adjusted baseline capital ﬂ  ight (KFADJ):
KFADJ = CDETADJ + NKI – CAD – CRES.          (1b)
Unfortunately, it is not possible to calculate an adjustment for the discrepancies in direct foreign and port-
folio equities investments because of data limitations. But if data allows, the procedure would be similar to 
that of CDETADJ; that is, the discrepancies in the FDI data between source-country and host-country are 
obtained the impact of foreign exchange ﬂ  uctuations are calculated. Th   e same applies for PORT. 
Th   e second set of adjustments concerns the current account. In particular, an adjustment is needed 
to account for systematic trade misinvoicing, which can be measured via trading-partner data comparison. 
Import overinvoicing and export underinvoicing are often signiﬁ  cant avenues for capital ﬂ  ight. Import under-
invoicing (technical smuggling) is undertaken to evade customs duties and trade regulations, but conceptu-
ally, it is a form of “reverse” capital ﬂ  ight in that it results in unrecorded ﬂ  ows of foreign exchange (smuggled 
goods must be paid for, even if they are no fully taxed). “Pure” (as opposed to technical) smuggling in which 
imported goods are not taxed or recorded at all can be captured by trading partner data comparison. Export 
overinvoicing can happen if there are incentives on the export performance of industries that lead to invoice 
padding. In any of these cases, the current account is inaccurate, thus we need to make the adjustment.
To determine the magnitude of total trade misinvoicing, we follow three steps. Th  e  ﬁ  rst step is to 
compute the export misinvoicing (DX) and import misinvoicing (DM) for a country in its trade with major 
industrialized-country trading-partners:
DX  =  PX  –  CIF  *  X,         (5a)
DM  =  M  –  CIF  *  PM,         (5b)
where PX is the industrialized-country trading-partner’s imports from country i, and PM is the industrial-
ized-country trading-partner’s exports to country i; X and M are country i’s exports to and imports from 
industrialized-country trading-partners, respectively; and CIF, the cif/fob factor, is an adjustment for the 
cost of freight and insurance. For Equations 5a and 5b, the trade data between country i and its industri-
alized-country trading-partners are utilized. Th   e rationale for doing this is that the information from the 
industrialized countries is expected to be more reliable compared to the data from the developing countries. 
Accordingly, positive values of DX and DM indicate net export underinvoicing and net import overinvoic-
ing, respectively; whereas negative values of DX and DM indicate net export overinvoicing and net import 
underinvoicing, respectively.
Next, the global export and import trade discrepancies of country i (MISX and MISM, respectively) 
are calculated. DX and DM are multiplied to the reciprocal of the shares of all industrialized-country trad-
ing-partners to country i’s total exports (X_INDUS) and total imports (M_INDUS) to obtain MISX and 
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MISX  =  DX  /  X_INDUS,        (6a)
MISM  =  DM  /  M_INDUS.        (6b)
Th   e last step is to obtain total trade misinvoicing (MIS) as the sum of Equations 6a and 6b. MIS is added to 
Equation 1b: 
KFADJ = CDETADJ + NKI – CAD – CRES + MIS.         (1c)
In addition to the trade misinvoicing adjustment, we make another adjustment on the current account for 
the unrecorded income remittances (UNREMIT). For developing countries that have sizeable numbers of 
overseas workers, remittances are a signiﬁ  cant component in the current account. If informal remittances are 
substantial, then it also requires an adjustment. To obtain an adjustment, we extrapolate the annual size of 
UNREMIT using an index for unrecorded remittance (UNREMIT Index): 
UNREMIT = REMIT * UNREMIT Index,          (7)
where REMIT is recorded overseas remittances. UNREMIT is added to Equation 1c, thus
KFADJ = CDETADJ + NKI – CAD – CRES + MIS + UNREMIT,            (1d)
which is called total capital ﬂ  ight (TKF). 
To make TKF ﬁ  gures comparable across periods, we calculate real capital ﬂ  ight (RKF), using the United 
States producer price index (PPI) in 1995 prices as the deﬂ  ator:
RKF  =  TKF  /  PPI.         (8)
To make RKF comparable across countries, we determine the relative burden of RKF to the (size of the) 
economy; that is, 
RKF_GDP  =  RKF  /  RGDP,        (9)
where RKF_GDP is the relative burden of RKF, and RGDP is real gross domestic product in 1995 prices. 
Analysis of the revolving door model of capital ﬂ  ight
In conventional analysis, capital scarcity is supposed to result in capital inﬂ  ow. Th   is situation occurs because 
the expected returns to capital are higher in places where at the margin it is scarce. By deﬁ  nition, capital is 
scarce in developing countries so we expect capital to ﬂ  ow to them. Typically, this process is facilitated by 
an attractive positive rate of return to capital. As capital scarcity becomes less of a constraint, the returns to 
capital decrease and its ﬂ  ow is expected to slow down. Eventually, capital will move to other places where the 
returns are relatively higher. In other words, market processes will ensure that capital is appropriately allo-
cated between areas where it is plenty and areas where it is scarce. Following this logic, we therefore make the 
following hypothesis: high rates of return to capital in a country decrease capital ﬂ  ight.8  DESA Working Paper No. 16
Conventional analysis also suggests that capital will ﬂ  ow to where it is most needed or desired; that 
is, to where it will be relatively more productive. As such, when a country is experiencing robust economic 
expansion, investments (both domestic and foreign) are pulled into the country to further fuel economic 
growth. Capital inﬂ  ows help to sustain that robust economic growth, but eventually diminishing returns and 
decreasing returns to capital should be expected. As long as the economy enjoys relatively higher returns to 
capital than do other places, however, investments will continue to ﬂ  ow in. Th   e converse applies as well. We 
therefore hypothesize that: high and sustained economic growth within a country decreases capital ﬂ  ight. 
Recent empirical studies challenge this conventional analysis. In fact, the evidence suggests that the 
direction of capital ﬂ  ows is often in reverse; that is, capital is moving away from the developing countries. 
When capital does ﬂ  ow to developing countries, it subsequently ﬂ  ows out as capital ﬂ  ight, thus a strong and 
positive correlation exists between the capital ﬂ  ows. Th   us, the revolving door model of capital ﬂ  ight is an at-
tempt to address this puzzle. Th   e model posits direct and indirect linkages between capital ﬂ  ight and external 
debt (Table 2).
Indirect linkages
One class of explanations posits only an indirect linkage between capital ﬂ  ight and external debt, with the 
contention that some overlapping sets of exogenous factors cause both capital ﬂ  ight and external borrowing. 
Capital ﬂ  ight occurs not because of capital inﬂ  ows or external debt per se, but rather because of, say, macro-
economic mismanagement. In similar fashion, developing countries are (now highly) indebted not because 
of capital ﬂ  ight but, again, because of macroeconomic mismanagement. Policy mistakes, corruption, rent-
seeking behaviour, weak domestic institutions, and the like, will induce capital ﬂ  ight and cause external debt 
problems. Another contention is that capital inﬂ  ows (especially during surges of capital ﬂ  ows) lead to risky 
or unsound investment decisions and over-borrowing. When governance structures and mechanisms for 
administrative controls and prudential regulation are weak, fragile or missing, money borrowed from abroad 
can end up being pocketed by the domestic elite (and usually transferred into private accounts abroad), spent 
on conspicuous consumption, or allocated into showcase and unproductive development projects that do 
not generate foreign exchange to ﬁ  nance external debt servicing. So capital ﬂ  ight and external borrowing are 
manifestations and responses to unfavourable domestic economic conditions. 
We can extend the above explanation to include new dimensions among the indirect linkages 
between capital ﬂ  ight and external debt, arising from recent developments in international ﬁ  nance and the 
global economy. Speciﬁ  cally, we consider the impact of deregulation and ﬁ  nancial liberalization on capital 
ﬂ  ight. In conventional wisdom, when a country adopts economic reforms, the expectation is that there will 
be no more capital ﬂ  ight. Accordingly, foreign savings will be made available to domestic entrepreneurs who 
in turn will use the cheap funds to build businesses, and create jobs and other infrastructure in the country. 
Table 2.
Typology of the determinants of capital ﬂ  ight and external borrowing
Indirect linkages Direction of linkages: (A) Exogenous variables   External debt
Capital ﬂ  ight
Direction of linkages: (B1) External debt  to capital ﬂ  ight (B2) Capital ﬂ  ight to external debt
Direct linkages
 (1) Means Debt-fueled ﬂ  ight  Flight-fueled debt
 (2) Motive Debt-driven ﬂ  ight  Flight-driven debt
Note: Table adapted from Boyce (1992).Revisiting the Revolving Door: Capital Flight from Southeast Asia  9
But such an outcome is only possible when economic reforms are pursued with complementary governance 
structures and administrative capacity. When these structures are weak, fragile or missing, deregulation and 
ﬁ  nancial liberalization will induce capital ﬂ  ight. Th   us deregulation and ﬁ  nancial liberalization have not only 
enabled developing countries to have greater access to external capital, but have also led these countries (and 
ﬁ  rms) to take risky and unsound investment decisions and over-borrow. Such action can be mediated by 
asymmetric risk problems that favour international ﬁ  nance / investment over domestic ﬁ  nance / investment, 
especially with regard to the expropriation of capital and taxation. But the consequent economic and ﬁ  nan-
cial crises have only induced more capital ﬂ  ight and greater external borrowing.
Furthermore, deregulation and ﬁ  nancial liberalization in developed countries have unleashed large 
amounts of capital seeking new investment areas with attractive returns. Th   e consequent increase in com-
petition in the capital markets and the tendency towards short-term and rapid investments have created an 
economic environment prone to ﬁ  nancial swings, crises, contagions, and economic stagnation. While it may 
be true that some developing countries have beneﬁ  ted from increased capital inﬂ  ows (i.e., availability of 
external savings), they have also found it more diﬃ   cult to manage their economies, as capital comes in and 
leaves rather quickly. In the end, we ﬁ  nd that developing countries experience frequent and severe ﬁ  nancial 
and economic crises, as demonstrated in the 1990s. In turn, we argue that capital ﬂ  ight has increased during 
the period of deregulation and ﬁ  nancial liberalization. Th   us we hypothesize that: deregulation and ﬁ  nancial 
liberalization increase capital ﬂ  ight and external borrowing.
Th   e discussion above implies that there is a supply-and-demand dimension underlying the indirect 
linkages to capital ﬂ  ows or external debt, and by extension, there is also a supply-and-demand dimension to 
capital ﬂ  ight and external borrowing. Th   is situation suggests that the eﬀ  ective management of both demand 
and supply of capital is needed to reduce capital ﬂ  ight. We argue that in a context where the institutions of 
governance and administrative capacity are weak, fragile, or missing, deregulation and ﬁ  nancial liberalization 
will result in greater economic vulnerability and intense ﬁ  nancial and economic crises, while governments 
become ineﬀ  ective, or unable to respond. In fact, McKinnon (1991) presciently warned that embarking on 
premature deregulation and rapid ﬁ  nancial liberalization of capital ﬂ  ows will result in unwarranted capital 
ﬂ  ight or unwarranted indebtedness, or both.
Th   e indirect linkages to capital ﬂ  ight would therefore be stronger in the presence of weak, fragile or 
missing governance structures and administrative capacity. Capital ﬂ  ight occurs because the prevailing condi-
tions allow it. In this framework, sound institutions and the pursuit of reforms in the proper manner, will 
reduce economic risk, sustain economic growth, and reduce capital ﬂ  ight.
While the indirect linkages may help explain a cross-sectional correlation between capital ﬂ  ight and 
external borrowing, it remains to be explained why there is often a close year-to-year correlation between 
capital ﬂ  ight and external debt and why, in some cases, capital ﬂ  ight tends to be persistent. Th   e tight cor-
relation between the current ﬂ  ows suggests a direct linkage between these variables. Th  e  correlation  between 
current and past capital ﬂ  ight, and between current and past borrowing, suggests persistence or hysteresis.3 
Direct linkages
Table 2 (above) also shows the direct linkages between capital ﬂ  ight and external debt. As shown in the 
table, there are two directions of direct linkages. In the ﬁ  rst, external debt provides the fuel or is the driver of 
3  Hysteresis may suggest a momentum eﬀ  ect or a habit-forming eﬀ  ect, implying the irreversibility of trends even when 
macroeconomic conditions improve. Hysteresis likewise applies to the indirect linkages.10  DESA Working Paper No. 16
capital ﬂ  ight; that is, capital inﬂ  ow has a “liquidity” (or fuel) eﬀ  ect, while its accumulation has a “stock” (or 
driver) eﬀ  ect. Th   e reverse link posits that capital ﬂ  ight creates the fuel or is the driver of borrowing; that is, 
capital ﬂ  ight (again) has a short-run “liquidity” eﬀ  ect but, as it persists, also has a “stock” eﬀ  ect.
External debt linked to capital ﬂ  ight 
Th   e argument that external debt fuels capital ﬂ  ight acknowledges the fact that loan proceeds can be “trans-
formed” from capital inﬂ  ow to capital ﬂ  ight. In this case, external debt provides the resources or funds 
for capital ﬂ  ight. Such funds could create conditions for capture as “loot” that individuals (often the elite) 
appropriate as their own. In fact, the (captured) funds may not even enter the country at all. Instead only 
accounting entries are done in the respective accounts of ﬁ  nancial institutions.
An important aspect of debt-fueled capital ﬂ  ight is the process of debt “layering” between the lender 
and the borrower in whose name the external debt is acquired. Th   ere is an asymmetry between the identity of 
the borrower and the liability holder, which is the public. Private external debts, for example, enjoy govern-
ment guarantees that eﬀ  ectively transform them into public debt (i.e., publicly guaranteed private debts). 
Because of debt guarantees, lenders become overconﬁ  dent and facilitate the provision of funds. At the same 
time, the guarantees eﬀ  ectively absolve the borrower of the responsibility of repaying the external debt in the 
event of a default. Precisely because of debt guarantees, borrowers become very eager to acquire external debts. 
In other words, such arrangements simultaneously create incentives for over-borrowing and over-lending. 
Potentially, therefore, all types of external borrowing are transferable as capital ﬂ  ight. Lenders are 
partly responsible for capital ﬂ  ight in developing countries insofar as they collude, indirectly or directly, with 
individuals who channel loan proceeds into capital ﬂ  ight. As long as lenders continue to provide the funds, 
debt-fueled capital ﬂ  ight will continue.4 And so we hypothesize that: an increase in capital inﬂ  ows from exter-
nal borrowing increases capital ﬂ  ight.
Th   e argument that external debt drives capital ﬂ  ight points to the fact that debt-servicing problems 
would eventually arise as debt accumulation goes out of hand. Th   us the accumulation of external debt sig-
nals increased risks, to which capital holders respond by pulling out capital to avoid unfavourable develop-
ments. Reinhart and Rogoﬀ   (2004) argue that a history of default, or a high potential of default, underpins 
much of the capital outﬂ  ows from developing countries. As such, a past history of default compounds the 
risk associated with external debts and debt accumulation, and thus drives capital ﬂ  ight. Th   e motivation for 
capital ﬂ  ight is to avoid the unfavourable developments due to a mounting stock of external debt. In this 
context, accumulated external debt has a “stock” eﬀ  ect on capital ﬂ  ight.
Faced with diﬃ   culties in servicing large external debts, developing countries often go into a struc-
tural adjustment programme. Th   ere are various components to such programmes, among them: reductions 
in public expenditures, raised taxes, and a tight monetary policy to reduce aggregate demand. Th  e  usual 
outcome is slower economic growth, at least in the short run. Th   e country becomes vulnerable in that unless 
it recovers and proceeds to sustained economic growth and development, it could regress into a worse situa-
tion. Often it is the latter that happens. In addition, there are signiﬁ  cant social and political changes associ-
ated with structural adjustments, which can adversely aﬀ  ect overall economic stability.
4 Th   is does not mean that developing countries should stop borrowing funds or that lenders should stop extending loans. 
Incurring external debt may sometimes be necessary to ﬁ  nance economic growth and development. What this suggests, 
therefore, is that lenders have to be judicious in the manner by which they provide loans. Th   ey have the responsibility 
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At the same time, greater external debt increases the demand for foreign exchange as debt servicing 
requirements increase. When demand reaches a point where international reserves are no longer adequate, a 
devaluation of the currency becomes inevitable. Like increasing taxes, a devaluation of the currency lowers 
the value of capital as well as the returns on investment. Th   e country becomes vulnerable, too. Faced with 
increased risks, capital holders convert their domestic assets to foreign assets, reinforcing pressure on foreign 
reserves. Overall, capital ﬂ  ight is a mechanism to avoid unfavourable economic conditions engendered by ex-
ternal debt accumulation. We thus hypothesize that: a higher total external indebtedness increases capital ﬂ  ight.
Of the two linkages described above, debt-fueled capital ﬂ  ight is contemporaneous with external 
borrowing, so they have a close year-to-year correlation. Debt-driven capital ﬂ  ight, on the other hand, has a 
lagged eﬀ  ect: it will not be contemporaneous with external borrowing, but a close correlation can be expect-
ed between capital ﬂ  ight and external debt stock (see, e.g., Collier, Hoeﬄ   er and Patillo, 2001; Ndikumana 
and Boyce, 2003). Th   e impact of the external debt stock on capital ﬂ  ight could be seen as reductions in 
international reserves. 
Capital ﬂ  ight linked to external debt 
Th   e second direction of linkages is ﬂ  ight-fueled borrowing and ﬂ  ight-driven borrowing. Flight-fueled bor-
rowing takes place when capital is pulled out from a country and then re-enters the same country in the 
form of external debt or foreign investment.5 In this case, domestic capital is ﬁ  rst converted into dollars, for 
example, and then deposited overseas; the depositor then takes a ‘loan’ from the same bank.6 In eﬀ  ect, this 
process conceals the source of the funds. It transforms capital that may have been acquired through inappro-
priate or dubious ways, into something legitimate. Also, ﬂ  ight-fueled borrowing serves as a pretext for oth-
erwise unexplained or “hidden” wealth. One crucial dimension of this process is that ﬂ  ight-fueled borrowing 
sheds the national character of the capital; that is, domestic capital re-emerges as foreign capital. Freed of 
domestic social controls, it is able to enjoy the privileges extended to foreign capital. Th   us we hypothesize 
that: an increase in capital ﬂ  ight increases external borrowing.
Flight-driven borrowing is a straightforward process. Capital ﬂ  ight drains domestic resources, there-
by generating demand to replenish the lost funds. As long as external debts enjoy government guarantees, 
ostensibly precluding the possibility of a default, funds will ﬂ  ow to the country in response to this demand. 
Again, this process is a “stock” eﬀ  ect rather than a “liquidity” eﬀ  ect. We hypothesize as follows: an increase in 
the stock of capital ﬂ  ight decreases international reserves and increases external borrowing.
Of the latter two types of linkages described above, ﬂ  ight-fueled borrowing is contemporaneous 
with capital ﬂ  ight; hence they have a close year-to-year correlation. Flight-driven borrowing has a lagged ef-
fect, possibly exhibited as a reduction in international reserves; and so it is not contemporaneous with capital 
ﬂ  ight. Note that the net eﬀ  ect on international reserves depends on the magnitude of capital ﬂ  ight relative to 
external borrowing.
5 When  capital  ﬂ  ight re-enters a country in the form of loans, we refer to these loans as “back-to-back” loans. On the 
other hand, when it enters a country as foreign investment, we refer to it as a “round-tripping investment”.
6  An extension works as follows: domestic capital is dollarized and deposited in an overseas bank, and then the depositor 
makes an investment to the source country using, say, a pseudo or proxy foreign company. Round-tripping is the 
mechanism for transforming funds acquired through questionable means into “unquestionable” foreign investments. 
It reﬂ  ects a further spin of the global ﬁ  nancial merry-go-round, in which foreign capital is extended as a loan or 
investment to developing countries, after which it ﬂ  ows back to ﬁ  nancial centers and is again lent to or invested in 
developing countries.12  DESA Working Paper No. 16
Econometrics of the revolving door model of capital ﬂ  ight
Empirical evidence suggests that there is a common set of determinants of capital ﬂ  ight and external borrow-
ing. Th   is observation is generally applicable in country and regional studies. For the revolving door model, 
evidence likewise suggests that capital ﬂ  ight and external debt have common determinants.7, 8 Th  ese  determi-
nants can be grouped into three broad themes: (1) capital ﬂ  ows / external debt; (2) economic performance; 
and (3) politics and governance. Th  e  ﬁ  rst theme covers the direct linkages of capital ﬂ  ight, while the latter 
two deal with are for the indirect linkages. Note that economic performance on the one hand, and politics 
and governance, on the other, are complex and diﬃ   cult concepts to untangle. For the econometric analysis, 
four sets of speciﬁ  c indicators are needed, as follows: (1) capital inﬂ  ows/external debt; (2) economic perfor-
mance indicators; (3) rates of return to capital and risk; and (4) politics-governance-institutions indicators. 
Capital inﬂ  ows/external debt
Capital inﬂ  ows and external debt are the most important variables explaining capital ﬂ  ight. Th  is  conclusion 
holds even using alternative speciﬁ  cations and estimation procedures. As for the revolving door model itself, 
the empirical evidence from the revolving door papers is strong especially for the fuel linkages, as it supports 
the contention that the causal relationships between external debt and capital ﬂ  ight run both ways and are 
strongly correlated year-to-year. Th   e empirical evidence is also robust for the drive linkage, especially for 
debt-driven capital ﬂ  ight. Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) even proposed that the reverse drive linkage could 
be veriﬁ  ed using international reserves instead of the lags of external debt, but they were unable to obtain 
empirical support for this proposal.
Th   ere are also alternative measures for capital inﬂ  ows. Th   e empirical evidence for such linkages ap-
pears dependent on the type of indicator used. Short-term capital ﬂ  ows tend to conﬁ  rm the fuel linkage (see, 
e.g., Cuddington, 1987). International aid and grants seem to have a positive linkage to capital ﬂ  ight (see, 
e.g., Hermes and Lensink, 1992; Collier, Hoeﬄ   er and Patillo, 2003). But the evidence for foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is mixed. Kant (1998) and Harrigan, Mavrotas and Yusop (2000), for example, found 
a negative linkage between FDI and capital ﬂ  ight; but Lensink, Hermes and Murinde (2000) and Collier, 
Hoeﬄ   er and Patillo (2001) did not obtain any statistically signiﬁ  cant relationship.9 Th   ere is no revolving 
door paper that uses any of these alternative speciﬁ  cations.
Trade ﬂ  ows have been used to proxy capital inﬂ  ows, but the empirical results are mixed. Mikkelsen 
(1991) and Lensink, Hermes and Murinde (2000) found no linkage between total trade and capital ﬂ  ight. 
Smit and Mocke (1991), however, obtained a positive linkage between the current account balance and 
capital ﬂ  ight. When trade-related variables are found to be signiﬁ  cant, the results are diﬃ   cult to interpret. 
7 Diﬀ  erences in estimation and econometric techniques contribute to diﬀ  erences in empirical results. But controlling for 
the estimation methods, empirical evidence suggests that there is a common set of determinants of capital ﬂ  ight. We 
will not attempt a survey of the literature, as Hermes, Lensink and Murinde (2003) and Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) 
provide excellent reviews.
8  Papers that use the revolving door model include Boyce (1992), Chipalkatti and Rishi (2001), Ndikumana and Boyce 
(2003), and Demir (2004), and simply refer to these papers as “revolving door papers”. 
9  Claessens, Dooley and Warner (1995) found the statistical properties (in particular, the volatility) of portfolio and 
direct foreign investments are similar, so a distinction between short-term and long-term ﬂ  ows may not be helpful. 
Sarno and Taylor (1999) have found a hierarchy of volatility in the various types of capital ﬂ  ows. Perhaps what 
matters is the composition of short-term and long term ﬂ  ows. FDI becomes an object for capital ﬂ  ight when it is used 
to acquire resources to fuel capital ﬂ  ight. Th   is process is possible because FDI is not “bolted” capital, although the 
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On one level, the results could suggest that there are available resources for capital ﬂ  ight; that is, there are 
“lootable” resources. On another level, the results could reﬂ  ect the size of normal (capital) ﬂ  ows, so a large 
trade (or current account) balance would mean bigger trade ﬁ  nancing, hence implying greater (oﬃ   cial) capi-
tal movement. A more favourable trade balance could also lead to a reduced demand for external funds (i.e., 
external borrowing) as revenues from trade are now available for trade ﬁ  nancing.10 Among the revolving door 
papers, Demir (2004), using the growth rate of the export-import ratio as a proxy for trade ﬂ  ows, obtained 
a positive link between capital ﬂ  ight and external debt, while Ndikumana and Boyce (2003), using total 
exports, got a positive linkage with capital ﬂ  ight alone.11 
But there can be hysteresis in capital ﬂ  ight and external debt. Today’s capital ﬂ  ight could mean 
future capital ﬂ  ight; today’s external debt could mean future borrowing. One way to assess hysteresis is to de-
termine whether or not the lags of capital ﬂ  ight (external debt) are statistically signiﬁ  cant. Among the revolv-
ing door papers, only Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) found statistical evidence for capital ﬂ  ight hysteresis.
Economic performance indicators
Sound economic performance will suggest a robust and sustainable economy where capital is likely to be at-
tracted and to remain. Consequently, we expect less capital ﬂ  ight from a country so characterised.
Economic growth is a key indicator of economic performance. Pastor (1990) and Ndikumana and 
Boyce (2003), for example, found a negative link between diﬀ  erential growth rates (i.e., a country’s own 
growth rate minus the foreign country’s growth rate) and capital ﬂ  ight. But when using only the country’s 
own growth rate for economic performance, the empirical evidence is actually mixed. Lensink, Hermes and 
Murinde (2000), for example, found a negative linkage between economic growth and capital ﬂ  ight, while 
Boyce (1992), Hermes and Lensink (1992), Chipalkatti and Rishi (2001), and Demir (2004) obtained 
no statistically signiﬁ  cant relationship at all. As Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) explain, the country’s own 
growth rate is problematic in part because it is aﬀ  ected by some of the same factors that trigger capital ﬂ  ight. 
Isolating its independent impact on capital ﬂ  ight can be diﬃ   cult. 
At the conceptual level, diﬀ  erential growth rates indicate the relative performance of economies, just 
as diﬀ  erential interest rates reveal the relative returns to capital (or investments). In this context, we think 
that the superior speciﬁ  cation would be the diﬀ  erential growth rates. Among the revolving door papers, all 
except for Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) used the country’s own growth rate, and found no statistically 
signiﬁ  cant relationship between economic growth and capital ﬂ  ight.
An alternative economic performance indicator is growth of exports. Robust export performance 
typically implies robust economic growth, especially if an economy is organized around the export sector. 
Accordingly, robust export growth is expected to reduce capital ﬂ  ight. Most of the research on capital ﬂ  ight 
does not use export (or trade) growth rates. Among the revolving door papers, Demir (2004) used a similar 
indicator but obtained a positive linkage with capital ﬂ  ight, while Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) employed 
total exports but only to assess the presence of “lootable” resources. 
10 Th   e sign of the coeﬃ   cient for trade and capital ﬂ  ight is indeterminate. A negative sign between normal capital outﬂ  ows 
and capital ﬂ  ight could mean that trade revenues substitute for external funds. A positive sign, on the other hand, 
could mean that trade increases the demand for trade ﬁ  nancing. Th   us a larger trade could indicate the availability of 
more resources for capital ﬂ  ight. 
11  Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) obtained a positive sign for the pooled regression, but a negative sign for the cross 
section regression; that is, exports can explain capital ﬂ  ight for within country but not inter-country variations.14  DESA Working Paper No. 16
Yet another alternative indicator for economic performance is government budget deﬁ  cit (or budget 
surplus). When there are large government budget deﬁ  cits, the expectation is that government will acquire 
domestic debt or external debt, or both. On one level, the deﬁ  cits could mean access to funds for capital 
ﬂ  ight; on another level, the deﬁ  cits could signal macroeconomic mismanagement. If capital holders are 
unsure about how the budget deﬁ  cits will be managed, or if they are unconvinced that the deﬁ  cits will be 
managed well, they will pull out capital to avoid unfavourable developments. As such, budget deﬁ  cits could 
have a positive lagged eﬀ  ect on capital ﬂ  ight. Alternatively, large government budget deﬁ  cits could mean 
that pump-priming activities are being undertaken to invigorate the economy, and if eﬀ  ective, will result in 
robust economic growth. As such, budget deﬁ  cits could have a negative lagged eﬀ  ect on capital ﬂ  ight. 
Th   e empirical evidence regarding budget deﬁ  cit (budget surplus) is mixed. For example, Hermes and 
Lensink (1992) found no statistically signiﬁ  cant relationship between budget deﬁ  cit and capital ﬂ  ight. Boyce 
(1992) and Chipalkatti and Rishi (2001) did not ﬁ  nd a statistically signiﬁ  cant relationship either. Using gov-
ernment budget surplus, Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) obtained ambiguous statistical results. For the other 
revolving door papers, the empirical evidence was rather mixed.
In addition to government budget deﬁ  cits (or surpluses), another alternative measure is taxation. 
But this likewise suﬀ  ers from possible dual interpretations, a problem analogous to those associated with the 
use of government deﬁ  cits. For instance, when the government has a good tax revenue position, then there 
is no need for external borrowing, as there are available resources to ﬁ  nance public expenditure. In fact, the 
government would have funds to pay its debt obligations. But a good tax revenue position could also mean 
that the government is able to borrow more funds, because the ability to collect taxes (and the availability 
of resources) improves the government’s credit rating. Similarly, the desire to avoid taxes could be a motive 
for capital ﬂ  ight, but a strong tax collection capacity may signal government’s having a greater capability to 
detect and deter tax evasion (including capital ﬂ  ight). 
Pastor (1990) and Vos (1992) found no statistically signiﬁ  cant relationship between taxes and capital 
ﬂ  ight. Hermes and Lensink (1992) obtained a positive linkage between the uncertainty of tax policy (i.e., tax 
variability) and capital ﬂ  ight.12 Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) argued that it may be problematic to charac-
terize government performance using a single indicator, such as government budget deﬁ  cit or taxation. But 
the more important problem is that data quality for taxes is often suspect, so empirical analysis would not 
reveal the true relationship between the indicator and capital ﬂ  ight. None of the revolving door papers uses 
taxes or uncertainty of tax policy as an indicator. 
Rates of return and risk indicators
Low rates of return to capital would push or repel capital to locations where the rates of return are relatively 
higher (and vice versa). Two measures of rates of return to capital have been used in the literature. Th  e  ﬁ  rst 
is a simple diﬀ  erential rate of return that may either be inter-country diﬀ  erences in nominal returns (see, 
e.g., Cuddington, 1987; Harrigan, Mavrotas and Yusop, 2000) or real returns (see, e.g., Boyce, 1992; Demir, 
2004). Th   e second is the diﬀ  erential rate of return plus some foreign exchange adjustment (see, e.g., Pas-
tor, 1990; Hermes and Lensink, 1992; Vos, 1992). For either speciﬁ  cation, the empirical evidence is rather 
mixed. Arguably, the second version is the more accurate indicator, as the ﬁ  rst version may not capture the 
open-economy eﬀ  ects. 
12 Th   e sign of the coeﬃ   cient for taxes is undetermined. Following Hermes and Lensink (1992), we argue that it could 
be the uncertainty of the tax policy that matters more with regard to capital ﬂ  ight. Th   ey measure the variance of 
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Among the risk indicators, the variables that are commonly used are: overvaluation of foreign 
exchange, and inﬂ  ation. An overvalued exchange rate raises expectations for a devaluation of the local cur-
rency. Th   e farther the adjustment is postponed, the stronger the expectation will be for the devaluation. Any 
sign of economic growth slowdown will more likely lead to economic instability and drive capital out of the 
country. To measure overvaluation, a black market premium (i.e., the ratio of the black market rate to the 
oﬃ   cial exchange rate) can be used as indicator. Schineller (1997) found a weak but positive linkage between 
the black market premium and capital ﬂ  ight. Among the revolving door papers, none uses a black market 
premium as indicator.
Inﬂ  ation is the important risk indicator. Basically, an inﬂ  ationary environment is not attractive to cap-
ital. Domestic capital holders will convert their domestic assets into foreign assets to avoid losses on the value 
of their capital. Indeed many analysts use inﬂ  ation as an indicator for the overall health of the economy. Most 
of the economic studies on capital ﬂ  ight include inﬂ  ation among the determinants (see, e.g., Hermes and Len-
sink, 1992; Pastor, 1990; Vos, 1992). Among the revolving door papers, only Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) 
used inﬂ  ation, but they found no statistically signiﬁ  cant relationship between inﬂ  ation and capital ﬂ  ight.
Lastly, we can also interpret the year-to-year ﬂ  ows in capital and external debt and their stocks 
(especially for external debt) as indicators of vulnerability. Th   ese can be interpreted as risk-related indicators. 
Th   us, the larger the capital ﬂ  ows become, the greater the vulnerability, especially when the ﬂ  ows are volatile, 
short-term, and easily reversible. A similar argument can be made for external debt. 
Political and governance indicators
Some studies on capital ﬂ  ight include political and governance indicators. If there is political instability or 
uncertainty, the economic environment is insecure and capital ﬂ  ees. Th   e capacity of institutions to respond 
to political and economic challenges is important as well. Unfortunately, the lack of useful data serves as the 
constraint to quantitatively determine how weak, fragile or missing institutions induce capital ﬂ  ight.13 Mean-
while, the conventional analysis is that corruption reduces economic growth and investment. Recent studies 
ﬁ  nd that there can be cases of economic growth despite corruption (see, e.g., Rock and Bonnett, 2004).
Political (or policy) uncertainty appears to have a positive link to capital ﬂ  ight (see, e.g., Lensink, 
Hermes and Murinde, 2000). Direct measures of political (or policy) uncertainty have been used, such as the 
number of labour strikes or the election of a left-wing party (see, e.g., Fatehi and Gupta, 1992; Gibson and 
Tskalotos, 1993), political crisis or the adoption of structural reform programmes (see, e.g., Chipalkatti and 
Rishi, 2001). Indirect measures have also been used such as proxies for political instability (see, e.g., Ndi-
kumana and Boyce, 2003), the variance of the foreign exchange rate (e.g., Harrigan, Mavrotas and Yusop, 
2000), or the level of tourist arrivals (see, e.g., Smit and Mocke, 1991). Th   ere are market-based indicators, 
too, like the market-risk perception of bankers (see, e.g., Collier, Hoeﬄ   er and Patillo, 2001). Regardless 
of the indicator used, the empirical results indicate that political risk and policy uncertainty are positively 
linked with capital ﬂ  ight. Among the revolving door papers, Boyce (1992), Chipalkatti and Rishi (2001) and 
Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) used political risk indicators, but they found a rather weak linkage between 
these indicators and capital ﬂ  ight. 
13  Unlike cross country data, political indicators do not show much variation. Th   ere is also diﬃ   culty interpreting political 
indicators across countries. For instance, corruption in Indonesia is qualitatively diﬀ  erent from corruption in the 
Philippines. Political indicators can be decisive factors in explaining capital ﬂ  ight. 16  DESA Working Paper No. 16
Lastly, we highlight two important aspects of governance, namely economic governance (i.e., 
macro-level) and corporate governance (i.e., micro-level). Each reinforces the other. Weak, fragile or missing 
institutions of governance and administrative capacity create vulnerability to speculative attacks and ﬁ  nancial 
and economic crises. Simultaneously, they make an economy incapable, even powerless to some extent, of 
responding to such attacks and crises. Th   us, as pointed out, ﬁ  nancial and economic crises are outcomes of 
a combination of institutional factors, on the one hand, and economic policy, on the other. At the micro-
level, a similar argument can also be made. Weak corporate and ﬁ  nancial governance create opportunities for 
private sector misbehaviour and mismanagement, including rent-seeking and risky behaviour. Indeed, they 
have all been linked to the recent economic and ﬁ  nancial crises in Asia (see, e.g., Jomo, 1998; Haggard and 
McIntyre, 2001). On the whole, we argue that weak, fragile or missing governance structures and admin-
istrative capacity have a positive impact on capital ﬂ  ight. Unfortunately, useful indicators are diﬃ   cult to 
obtain. Among the revolving door papers, none actually uses a governance indicator.
General setup of the revolving door model 
Incorporating the direct and indirect linkages (Z), the revolving door can be presented in the following gen-
eral functional form:
KF = f(CDET, SDET, Z)       (10)
CDET = f(KF, RES-1, Z)
where KF stands for capital ﬂ  ight, CDET for net additions to external debt, SDET for external debt stock, 
and RES-1 for lagged of total international reserves representing the direct linkages on capital ﬂ  ight and 
external debt, respectively. Z is a vector of variables. Th   e general setup consists of simultaneous equations to 
allow for simultaneity in KF and CDET. Only CDET, KF, SDET, and RES are speciﬁ  ed in Equation 1, but 
what goes into Z depends on the country context. For now, we can specify the following structural form:
KF = α0 + α1 CDET + α2 SDET + α3 Z + e1      (11)
CDET = β0 + β1 KF + β2 RES-1 + β3 Z + e2.
To test for the fuel linkages, the hypotheses are α1 > 0 and β1 > 0; for the drive linkages, α2 > 0 and 
β2 > 0. Th   e signs of α3 and β3 depend on the chosen indicators. 
Why was capital ﬂ  eeing Southeast Asia?
In this section, the results on the revolving door model as applied to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Th   ailand are presented. First to be discussed are the lists of determinants and data sources, and the 
analysis follows.
Capital inﬂ  ows / external debt
Figures on net additions to external debt (CDET) are used for capital inﬂ  ows (adjusted for the impact of 
foreign exchange rate ﬂ  uctuations). CDET will be used to test for the fuel linkage on capital ﬂ  ight, while 
the external debt stock (SDET) will be used to test for the drive linkage. KF will be used to test for the fuel 
linkage with external debt, while the lagged of total international reserves (RES-1) will be used to test for the Revisiting the Revolving Door: Capital Flight from Southeast Asia  17
drive linkage. Note that both SDET and RES-1 can also be interpreted as risk indicators due to external debt 
and capital ﬂ  ight, respectively.
Economic performance
For economic performance, we will use the lagged economic growth rates (GROW). For the four South-
east Asian countries we study, GROW-1 rather than diﬀ  erential growth rates is arguably more appropriate 
because the levels of economic performance in the region were simply impressive. From the 1980s until 
the 1997-1998 Asian ﬁ  nancial and economic crises, the growth rates of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Th  ailand 
were among the highest in the world. Th   us, there were strong expectations that the robust economic perfor-
mance would continue in the 1990s. Th   e Philippines was the exception among the four countries, because 
its growth was intermittent; it also had (historically) failed to sustain high growth rates for more than three 
to four consecutive years. But while the Philippines lagged in economic performance compared to the other 
three countries, on average, its growth rate was better than the average of the developing world as a whole. 
Th   e lagged of the current account deﬁ  cit (CAD) can be used as an alternative indicator to GROW-1. 
Note that GROW and CAD are positively correlated, especially in the context where economic growth is 
driven by exports that are import-dependent; that is, more rapid economic growth is associated with a larger 
CAD. At the same time, CAD-1 can also be interpreted as a risk indicator of the sustainability of economic 
growth in two ways. Firstly, a low CAD-1 would imply a “lower quality” of economic performance (via the 
performance of the export sector). Secondly, large and unsustainable CAD will suggest signiﬁ  cant eco-
nomic adjustments in the future, and so it can adversely aﬀ  ect future economic performance. Furthermore, 
when CAD is dominantly ﬁ  nanced by capital inﬂ  ows—hence economic growth is also ﬁ  nanced by capital 
inﬂ  ows—there is greater risk for sudden stops and reversals in capital ﬂ  ows, especially in an environment 
where capital is mobile, volatile, and (increasingly) short-term in nature.
We will not use other indicators for economic performance, such as inﬂ  ation and budget deﬁ  cits. 
We take the lead from Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) that these indicators would be problematic to use in 
the revolving door model. It is not advisable to use inﬂ  ation, as most of the production inputs are imported. 
Th   us, domestic inﬂ  ation may partly consist of imported inﬂ  ation. In fact, it is likely that domestic inﬂ  ation 
is predominantly supply-driven, and not demand-driven (the latter reﬂ  ects robust economic expansion). 
Using budget deﬁ  cit is also not suggested, as debt servicing can distort government expenditure ﬁ  gures. It is 
particularly problematic when indebted countries have some form of automatic appropriations for principal 
and interest payments built into government budgets. On the other hand, budget surplus is problematic 
because governments can have (signiﬁ  cant) oﬀ  -budget accounts.14 
Rates of return and risk
For the rates of return to capital, we will use either the diﬀ  erential rates of return (INT) or the change in dif-
ferential rates of return (CINT), deﬁ  ned as the domestic deposit rate minus the United States 90-day Treasury 
bill interest rate. We will not include any adjustment for the depreciation of foreign exchange because the 
currencies of the four Southeast Asian countries we study were either on managed ﬂ  oat, quasi-pegged or, as in 
14  In an open economy framework, CAD and budget deﬁ  cits (BD) have a positive correlation. Th   e direction of causality 
is from BD to CAD. Th   us, under ﬂ  exible exchange rates, BD induces an upward pressure on the interest rate, causing 
capital inﬂ  ows, an appreciation of the currency, and increasing CAD. Under the ﬁ  xed exchange rate, on the other 
hand, BD stimulates aggregate demand, thereby increasing incomes or prices, and thus, increasing CAD. If the 
direction of causality is reversed, it is called ‘current account targeting’. In this case, CAD aﬀ  ects economic growth, in 
turn, it aﬀ  ects BD. Th   ere could also be bi-directional linkages between BD and CAD.18  DESA Working Paper No. 16
the case of Th   ailand before June 1997, ﬁ  xed. In fact, the currency (or quasi) pegs enjoyed such a high degree of 
credibility during the 1990s that exchange rate risk was practically zero. Note that we use INT (or CINT) as 
indirect linkage indicators on both capital ﬂ  ight and external debt. A positive INT (or CINT) will lead to a de-
crease in capital ﬂ  ight, but not to an increase in external debt. Note that these indicators are risk variables, too.
We will use the lag of total international reserves (RES) or the accumulation of international reserves 
(CRES) to proxy for the foreign exchange risk. A large (discrete) reduction in RES-1 (i.e., a large CRES-1) 
could imply the increased dollarization of domestic assets and capital ﬂ  ight, which would be the case during 
an economic or political crisis.
Politics and governance
Political and governance indicators are the most diﬃ   cult to identify. For the four Southeast Asian countries, 
we reviewed country studies to be able to identify the appropriate variables to use. To improve the precision 
of our choice of variables, we interviewed key resource persons in each of the four countries. 
We will use dummy variables for political and governance indicators. In particular, we will test for 
indirect linkages of ﬁ  nancial liberalization (D1), banking deregulation (D2), the implementation of a distinc-
tive domestic economic policy (D3), and the 1997–1998 Asian ﬁ  nancial crises (D4) on capital ﬂ  ight and 
external debt. Note that these indicators are indirect political and governance indicators and are rough prox-
ies. Data for direct political indicators, such as political freedom and civil liberties, do not show suﬃ   cient 
variation for each country over time. We expect that direct indicators for politics and governance will be not 
give useful statistical results, and so direct indicators were not used.
Data sources
Estimates of capital ﬂ  ight (KF) were computed using a modiﬁ  ed residual method; that is, the net of oﬃ   cially 
recorded capital inﬂ  ows and recorded foreign exchange outﬂ  ows, adjusted for trade mis-invoicing (MIS) and 
unrecorded remittances (UNREMIT), or KF = CDET + NKI – CAD – CRES + MIS + UNREMIT, where 
NKI stands for net non-debt creating capital inﬂ  ows (i.e., net direct and portfolio investments), and the 
other terms are as deﬁ  ned earlier. Beja (2006a) discusses estimates of capital ﬂ  ight from the four Southeast 
Asian countries covered in this paper. Th   e data for the other economic indicators (e.g., domestic interest 
rates, 90-day US Treasury bill rate, exports and imports, GDP, and RES) were taken from the International 
Financial Statistics 2004 CD-ROM and the World Development Indicators 2004 CD-ROM. Data for the 
political and governance indicators were constructed after a review of the economic histories of the four 
Southeast Asian countries. Table 3 presents a summary of the dummy variables used in the regressions.
In order for the variables to have the same dimension and thus minimize estimation biases associated 
with the use of nominal values, CDET, SDET, KF, CAD, CRES, and RES are expressed as percentages of GDP 
(in 1995 constant prices). Th   e other variables (e.g., INT and CINT) are expressed in percentages, as well.
Revolving door model of capital ﬂ  ight for Southeast Asia
Th   us we present a revolving door speciﬁ  cation for Southeast Asia as follows:
KF = α0 + α1 CDET + α2 SDET + α3 KF-i + α4 EP + α5 RR + α6 Di + e1   (12)
CDET = β0 + β1 KF + β2 RES-1 + β3 CDET-i + β4 EP + β5 RR + β6 Di + e2,Table 3.
List of dummy variables
Dummy variable: D = 1; 0 otherwise Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand
D1 = ﬁ  nancial liberalization 1970–2002 1971–1982;
1991–2002
1985–2002 1991–2002
D2 = banking deregulation 1988–1994 N/A 1995–2002 1993–2002
D3 = distinctive economic policy N/A 1971–1990 N/A N/A
D4 = 1997–1998 Asian ﬁ  nancial/economic crisis 1998–1999 1997–1998 1997–1998 1997–1998
where EP is an economic performance indicator (i.e., GROW-1 or CAD-1); RR stands for the rate of return 
and risk indicators (i.e., INT or CINT); and Di signiﬁ  es dummy variables (to proxy for other exogenous 
variables): D1 for ﬁ  nancial liberalization, D2 for banking deregulation, D3 for the implementation of a 
distinctive domestic economic policy, and D4 for the 1997–1998 Asian ﬁ  nancial and economic crises. In 
addition, we include interaction terms in the right-hand side of Equation 3. Th   ough rudimentary, these in-
teraction terms could capture the overlap between the dummy variables and direct linkages or the continued 
application of an economic policy, such as ﬁ  nancial liberalization. As indicated in the previous section, α1 > 
0 and β1 > 0 capture the fuel linkages, while α2 > 0 and β2 > 0 are for the drive linkages. Hysteresis on capital 
ﬂ  ight means α3 > 0, while on external debt, β3 > 0. Note that the following are possible: β2 <0 and β3 < 0. 
Also α4, α5, β4, and β5 may be positive or negative, depending on the particular indicator used. Th  e  same 
applies for α6 and β6. Finally, Equation 3 is estimated using Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) procedure to 
address the simultaneity problem.15 And stepwise regression was followed; that is, after estimating the basic 
model, the statistically insigniﬁ  cant indicators were removed, and the revised model re-estimated. Moreover, 
OLS violations are tested and corrected.
Determinants of capital ﬂ  ight
Table 4 (below) summarizes the regression results on the determinants of capital ﬂ  ight for Southeast Asia. In 
the case of Indonesia, we ﬁ  nd evidence of debt-fuel and debt-driven capital ﬂ  ight, although SDET was sta-
tistically weak. Th   e results suggest a dollar of external borrowing can induce about 94 cents of capital ﬂ  ight 
(debt-fuel) each year. From an economic point of view, the result on the stock of external debt also suggests 
a further 3 cents of capital ﬂ  ight (debt-driven) was induced in subsequent years. Th   erefore, the total relation-
ship between external debt and capital ﬂ  ight direct linkages was about one-to-one over the period 1970 to 
2002. Of course, this result is not surprising considering that, among the four Southeast Asian countries we 
study, Indonesia had the highest external debt to GDP ratio (Table 1).
On the indirect linkages, the results suggest that robust economic performance (proxied by GROW-1) 
was negatively correlated with KF. Th   e results likewise suggest that the level of international reserves (RES-1) 
and changes in interest rate diﬀ  erentials (CINT-1) were negatively correlated with KF. We did not ﬁ  nd statisti-
cal evidence of capital ﬂ  ight hysteresis. But we found that the dummy for the 1997–1998 Asian ﬁ  nancial and 
economic crises (D4) was statistically signiﬁ  cant, revealing that indeed the crisis was devastating to Indonesia.16 
In the case of Malaysia, we found evidence of debt-fueled capital ﬂ  ight. However, there was no debt-
driven capital ﬂ  ight. Th   us, for every dollar of external borrowing, 55 cents of capital ﬂ  ight (debt-fueled) was 
15 Th   e instruments are CDET-1, KF-1, RES-(i+1), and XM-i, where XM is exports plus imports. XM is also expressed as a 
percentage of GDP. Two Stage Least Squares or Th   ree Stage Least Squares can be used in the regression, but the results 
are qualitatively similar, though the latter could have lower standard errors.
16 D4 = 1 from 1998 to 1999; and D1 = 0 otherwise (Table 3). 
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Table 4
Determinants of capital ﬂ  ight for Southeast Asia
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand
Constant  -6.47 15.20  -4.22  6.21
   [-3.25]***  [6.15]***  [-0.86]  [2.58]***
CDET 0.94 0.55  0.40  0.12
 [9.15]***  [4.75]***  [1.44] a  [1.34]a
SDET 0.03 0.03  0.12  0.11
 [1.35] a  [0.95]  [2.38]**  [2.53]***
GROW-1 -0.44 -0.86 -0.72





CINT -0.12  
 [-1.68]*  
RES-1 -0.24   -0.60 -0.23











Adj. R2  0.89  0.64 0.40  0.78
DW  1.64  1.94 1.87  1.81
F-Stat 43.55 18.77 4.48 14.53
p-value  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00
Notes: 
(1)  *** = 1 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; * = 10 per cent; a = 15 per cent (i.e., weakly signiﬁ  cant). Numbers in braces are t-values.
(2) D1 = ﬁ  nancial liberalization; D2 = banking deregulation, D3 = NEP; and D4 = 1997–1998 Asian ﬁ  nancial and economic crises.
(3)  Alternative indicators (column 1 in Table 4) were used in the regression. For instance, when GROW-1 was found to be 
statistically insigniﬁ  cant, it was replaced with CAD1, as in the Malaysian case. Only the best regression results are presented in the 
table.
(4)  For Indonesia, we estimated a model with decade dummies (e.g., Y70 and Y80 for the 1970s and 1980s, respectively):
  KF = -9.68 +         0.92 CDET + 0.05 SDET + 0.61 GROW-1 + 0.24 RES-1 – 0.03 CINT + 1.50 D4 
            (-3.54)***   (9.54)***        (2.21)**          (3.40)***            (1.74)*            (-0.44)           (3.53)*** 
            + 0.35 Y70 + 2.28 Y80
               (0.29)        (2.09)**
  Adj. R2 = 0.90 DW = 1.69 F-Stat = 38.83 (0.00)***Revisiting the Revolving Door: Capital Flight from Southeast Asia  21
induced each year over the period 1970 to 2002.17 Among the four Southeast Asian countries, Malaysia had 
the lowest debt-fueled capital ﬂ  ight, which is consistent with its external debt to GDP ratio (Table 1). 
On the indirect linkages, the results suggest that robust economic performance (proxied by CAD-1) 
was negatively correlated with KF. Because Malaysia is a small country, it logically relies on its export sector 
to sustain its robust economic performance. Th   e results also suggest that changes in the level of the inter-
national reserves were negatively correlated with KF. We found statistical evidence that the New Economic 
Policy (NEP) (D3) induced more capital ﬂ  ight, but its interaction with CDET was not statistically signiﬁ  -
cant.18 Indeed, this ﬁ  nding conﬁ  rms the contention of some scholars that the NEP (along with its associated 
programmes) is an important explanation for capital ﬂ  ight during the 1970s and 1980s (see, e.g., Jomo, 
1990; Khoo, 1995, 2000).
In the case of the Philippines, we found evidence of debt-fueled and debt-driven capital ﬂ  ight, 
although CDET was found to be statistically weak. In fact, the results corroborate the ﬁ  ndings of Boyce 
(1992). In our case, however, the results suggest that for every dollar of external borrowing, about 40 cents 
of capital ﬂ  ight (debt-fueled) was induced in the pre-liberalization period, but the level reached US$1.04 
during the liberalization period, which implies that there were more avenues for capital to ﬂ  ee. Also, the 
increasing stock of external debt further induced an additional 12 cents of capital ﬂ  ight (debt-driven). Th  us 
we found at least 52 cents of external debt ending up as capital ﬂ  ight each year, but during the liberalization 
period, there were about US$1.15 of capital ﬂ  ight each year. Th   is result is very alarming, as it suggests that 
more capital was ﬂ  owing out of the country, and consequently a hollowing out of the Philippine economy 
was taking place.
On the indirect linkages, the results suggest that robust economic performance (proxied by 
GROW- 1) was negatively correlated with KF. Th   e results also suggest that the level of international reserves 
(RES-1) was negatively correlated with KF. We did not ﬁ  nd statistical evidence of capital ﬂ  ight hysteresis. 
None of the dummy variables and the interaction terms was found to be statistically signiﬁ  cant, except for 
the interaction term for ﬁ  nancial liberalization (D1) and CDET.19 Th   e result revealed an additional 64 cents 
of capital ﬂ  ight for each dollar of external debt. Th   us deregulation and ﬁ  nancial liberalization resulted in 
more opportunities for capital ﬂ  ight. 
Finally, for Th   ailand, we also found evidence of debt-fueled and debt-driven capital ﬂ  ight. As in the 
case of the Philippines, the result on CDET was found to be statistically weak. Th   us each dollar of external 
borrowing induced about 12 cents of capital ﬂ  ight each year. In addition, a further 11 cents of capital ﬂ  ight 
was due to external debt accumulation. Th   erefore about 23 cents of capital ﬂ  ight was induced by external 
borrowing each year. 
Lastly, results conﬁ  rmed that robust economic performance (proxied by GROW-1) is negatively 
correlated with KF. In addition, the results conﬁ  rmed that the level of international reserves (RES-1) was 
negatively correlated with KF. We also did not ﬁ  nd statistical evidence of capital ﬂ  ight hysteresis. Th  e 
17  Although the regression results indicate that SDET is not statistically signiﬁ  cant, it can still be argued that, from an 
economic point of view, there might be an additional 3 cents of capital ﬂ  ight in subsequent years due to external debt 
accumulation. 
18 D3 = 1 in 1971-1990; and D3 = 0 otherwise (Table 3). Th   e NEP ended in 1990.
19 D1 = 1 from 1985 to 2002; and D1 = 0 otherwise (Table 3). Deregulation and ﬁ  nancial liberalization programmes 
started in 1985. During the Ramos administration (1992–1998), the Government implemented a more aggressive 
liberalization programme, opening the capital account in 1993. Th   e banking sector was deregulated in 1995.22  DESA Working Paper No. 16
dummy variables and their interaction terms were not statistically signiﬁ  cant except for the interaction of the 
1997–1998 Asian ﬁ  nancial and economic crises (D4) and CDET. Th   e results suggest that US$1.09 for every 
dollar of external borrowing ended up as capital ﬂ  ight.20 From an economic point of view, we have 12 cents 
of CDET was fuelling capital ﬂ  ight between 1970 and 2002, except in 1997 and 1998 when about US$1.20 
of CDET was fuelling capital ﬂ  ight. 
Determinants of external borrowing
Table 5 (below) summarizes the results on the determinants of external borrowing for Southeast Asia. In the 
case of Indonesia, we found evidence of ﬂ  ight-fueled external borrowing. A dollar of capital ﬂ  ight induced 
56 cents of additional external borrowing is undertaken each year. But the results suggest that there was no 
ﬂ  ight-driven linkage in Indonesia.
For the indirect linkages, we found that Indonesia’s economic performance (proxied by GROW-1) 
has a negative correlation with CDET. Th   is result suggests that with robust economic growth, Indonesia can 
rely more on its own domestic income (domestic savings) than on external funds. Th  is  ﬁ  nding is also consis-
tent with the result for RES-1, which suggests that a high level of international reserves (due to, say, accumu-
lation of foreign exchange as a result of robust growth via exports) enabled Indonesia to rely less on external 
funds. Th   e result for interest rate diﬀ  erentials (INT) was not statistically signiﬁ  cant with regard to external 
borrowing. Of course, as an oil-producing country, Indonesia can aﬀ  ord to generate capital by exploiting this 
natural resource. Th  e  coeﬃ   cient on the dummy for banking deregulation (D2) showed a negative correlation 
with CDET, implying that less external borrowing was undertaken during the banking deregulation period.21 
Th   is result for Indonesia might be surprising at ﬁ  rst glance. But a closer review of the banking de-
regulation programme will reveal that the borrowing pattern actually shifted more to domestic sources rather 
than external sources, particularly with Bank Indonesia providing the credit instruments or certiﬁ  cates. 
However, the result on the interaction of D2 and KF revealed that partly because of capital ﬂ  ight (during 
the same period), there was increased external borrowing. Th   us a dollar of capital ﬂ  ight resulted in about 
39 cents of external borrowing each year during the deregulation period, which is further evidence of the 
ﬂ  ight-fueled process. Th   ese seemingly contradictory results can be rationalized as evidence of the dynamics 
of capital ﬂ  ows in the context of free capital movements in Indonesia.
In the case of Malaysia, we found evidence of ﬂ  ight-fueled external borrowing. Th   at is, each dol-
lar of capital ﬂ  ight induced 36 cents of external borrowing is undertaken each year. Th   e results suggest that 
there was no ﬂ  ight-driven external borrowing (which is actually consistent with the analysis of the results in 
Table 4). 
For the indirect linkages, robust economic performance (proxied by CAD-1) was positively correlated 
with CDET. As pointed out earlier, Malaysia relies heavily on its export sector. But robust economic growth 
(via the export sector) was ﬁ  nanced by external borrowing. Th   e results suggest that for every dollar of CAD, 
Malaysia acquired about 45 cents of external debt. Th   e level of international reserves (proxied by RES-1) was 
positively correlated with CDET, which suggests that larger reserves improve Malaysia’s credit rating so that 
it was able to borrow more. 
20 D4 = 1 from 1997 to 1998; and D4 = 0 otherwise (Table 3).
21 D2 = 1 in 1988-1994; and D2 = 0 otherwise (Table 3).Revisiting the Revolving Door: Capital Flight from Southeast Asia  23
Th   e results for the dummy variables are interesting, too. For instance, ﬁ  nancial liberalization (D1) 
was positively correlated to CDET, which is consistent with what scholars have pointed out: access to exter-
nal funds was closely controlled or monitored by the authorities in the late 1980s (e.g., Caprio, Atiyas and 
Hanson, 1994; Caprio, Honohan and Stiglitz, 2001; Hamilton-Hart, 2002).22 Moreover, we found that the 
dummy for the NEP (D3) had a positive correlation with CDET.23 Again, this ﬁ  nding conﬁ  rms the earlier 
analysis of scholars that the Malaysian Government resorted to external borrowing to ﬁ  nance the NEP and 
its associated programmes (Jomo, 1990; Khoo, 1995, 2000). Another interesting result is the interaction 
22 D1 = 1 from 1971 to 1982 and from 1991 to 2002; and D1 = 0 otherwise (Table 3). 
23 D3 = 1 from 1971 to 1990; and D3 = 0 otherwise (Table 3). Th   e NEP ended in 1990.
Table 5.
Determinants of external borrowing for Southeast Asia
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand
Constant 5.77 -2.00 -1.79  19.02
 [3.82]***  [-0.74]  [-0.77]  [2.86]
KF 0.56 0.36  0.68  0.68
 [3.52]***  [2.41]**  [3.17]***  [1.26]a
RES-1 -0.33 0.05  0.60  -0.73
 [-4.30]***  [0.30]  [2.98]***  [-3.59]***
CDET-1  0.31
   [1.60]*
GROW-1 -0.24  -0.90
 [-2.06]**  [-1.57]*
CAD-1 0.45 0.33














   [2.54]***
Adj. R2  0.74  0.68  0.55 0.40
DW  1.94  2.02  1.91 1.64
F-Stat 16.15 12.03  7.68 6.93
p-value  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00
Notes:
(1)  *** = 1 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; * = 10 per cent; a = +15 per cent (i.e., weakly signiﬁ  cant). Values in brackets are t-values.
(2) D1 = ﬁ  nancial liberalization; D2 = banking deregulation, D3 = NEP; and D4 = 1997–1998 Asian ﬁ  nancial and economic crises.
(3)  As in Table 4, alternative indicators (column 1) were used in the regressions. Only the best regression results are presented in 
the table.24  DESA Working Paper No. 16
of D4 and KF, which reveals a negative correlation, which suggests that policies implemented during the 
1997–1998 Asian ﬁ  nancial and economic crises (such as capital controls and other counter-cyclical policies) 
reduced capital ﬂ  ight.24
In the case of the Philippines, we found evidence of ﬂ  ight-fueled and ﬂ  ight-driven external borrow-
ing. Again, our ﬁ  ndings corroborate the results of Boyce (1992). In our case, the results suggest that each 
dollar of capital ﬂ  ight induced about 68 cents of borrowing each year. Th   e results for the ﬂ  ight-driven link-
age suggests that a further 60 cents of borrowing took place. Additional ﬂ  ight-fueled borrowing was revealed 
by the positive correlation of the interaction of banking deregulation (D2) and KF.25 Th   is result implies that, 
in the case of the Philippines, banking deregulation resulted in more external borrowing. Overall, the direct 
linkages indicate US$1.73 of borrowing for each dollar of capital ﬂ  ight. Interestingly, we found no statistical 
evidence of external borrowing hysteresis, which may be controversial since the Philippines has had a his-
tory of borrowing to ﬁ  nance debt services. Arguably, the level of international reserves (RES-1) captures this 
dimension of the political economy of debt management in the country.
Among the indirect linkages, the results show that economic growth performance (proxied by 
CAD-1) was positively correlated with CDET. Th   is result is not surprising since the Philippines has had a 
low level of domestic savings relative to its Southeast Asian neighbours. We further argue that this result is 
consistent with the “twin” deﬁ  cits argument; that is, budget deﬁ  cits in the Philippines led to current account 
deﬁ  cits, which in turn were ﬁ  nanced by external borrowing.
In the case of Th   ailand, we found evidence of ﬂ  ight-fueled external borrowing; but in contrast to the 
Philippines, the coeﬃ   cient on KF was statistically weak. Th   e results suggest that for a dollar of capital ﬂ  ight, 
68 cents of external borrowing was undertaken. Th   e results suggest that there was no ﬂ  ight-driven linkage in 
Th   ailand. In fact, a high level of international reserves (RES-1) reduced the demand for external borrowing.
Finally, neither the dummy variables nor the interaction terms were found to be signiﬁ  cant except 
for the interaction of ﬁ  nancial liberalization (D1) and interest rate diﬀ  erentials (INT), suggesting that ﬁ  nan-
cial liberalization resulted in more borrowing and that it was encouraged by the prevailing high domestic 
interest rates in the country.26 Indeed, a wide interest rate diﬀ  erential prevailed in Th   ailand in the 1990s and 
can partly explain why the capital account (especially private external borrowing) ballooned to alarming lev-
els (see, e.g., Ammar, 2000). Th   is result can also be interpreted to mean that ﬁ  nancial liberalization was not 
bringing about the anticipated beneﬁ  ts (e.g., lower interest rates and competitive ﬁ  nancial markets). In fact, 
the result on CDET-1 indicates hysteresis: a dollar of previous external debt led to further external borrowing 
of about 30 cents. On the indirect linkages, the results show that robust economic performance (proxied by 
GROW-1) is negatively correlated with CDET.
24  Jomo K.S. pointed out that the impact of the 1998 capital controls might only be a coincidence since by late 1998, 
the conditions had improved both in Malaysia and globally (interview September 2004). Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) 
stressed that the introduction of the 1998 capital controls gave the Malaysian Government greater autonomy in 
economic policy, especially in managing capital ﬂ  ows. In eﬀ  ect, the innovation provided the country with a tool for 
minimizing the adverse impacts of the crisis and regaining control of the economy.
25 D2 = 1 from 1995 to 2002; and D2 = 0 otherwise. Th   e banking sector was deregulated in 1995.
26 D1 = 1 from 1991 to 2000; and D1 = 0 otherwise (Table 3). Full ﬁ  nancial liberalization was achieved by1991; the 
capital account was opened in late 1990. Th   e Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF) was introduced in 1993 
in the hope that it would encourage competition among the domestic commercial banks and give domestic enterprises 
greater and cheaper access to ﬁ  nance. BIBF was also expected to facilitate an “out-out” ﬂ  ow of ﬁ  nance (i.e., borrowing 
from abroad and on-lending abroad). It turned out, however, that the BIBF encouraged the “out-in” ﬂ  ow of ﬁ  nance 
(i.e., borrowing from abroad and on-lending domestically) and lending became predominantly short-term.Revisiting the Revolving Door: Capital Flight from Southeast Asia  25
Th   erefore, the above results suggest the need for decisive policy action. For one, there is a need for 
better domestic management of external debts. Th   e responsibility of the government is to make sure that ex-
ternal debts beneﬁ  t its domestic residents—not that they enrich a few individuals. Th   us, a government that 
misuses funds is itself liable for the external debt and must not impose this burden on the public. Creditors 
must also share responsibility in the management of external debts through the application of sound lending 
policies or some form of involvement in the eﬀ  ective use or disbursement of funds. In cases where external 
borrowings were actually misused, or proof cannot be presented to demonstrate that the funds were actu-
ally used to improve the social conditions of the domestic residents, or if borrowed funds cannot be traced, 
it can be concluded that those funds were diverted to line the pockets of a few individuals, and more likely, 
as capital ﬂ  ight. If creditors ignore, or pretend not to see, that borrowed funds were used to beneﬁ  t only 
the elite, or if they do not act to redress the situation, they too are accountable for the country’s indebted-
ness. In such cases, domestic residents must question the legitimacy of external debts and the rationale for 
continuing to honour such debts that society, as a whole, does not beneﬁ  t from. Th   en some form of debt 
relief should be demanded from the creditors. Or alternative debt-relief programmes should be explored by 
both the government and the creditors, such as interest-rate payment cancellations and rescheduling of debt 
principal—though in cases where borrowed funds are odious in nature, amortizations must be cancelled—so 
that society will not any more bear the adverse consequences of external indebtedness.
Th   e results on the indirect linkages suggest the importance of sound macroeconomic management. 
Countries unable to sustain economic growth, because of poor macroeconomic policies or uncompetitive 
economic sectors, will discourage domestic and foreign investors. Th   is can lead to conditions conducive to 
capital ﬂ  ight. We therefore argue that there is a need for countries to maintain eﬀ  ective control of the direc-
tion and management of their economies. Because of these macroeconomic linkages, there is also a need for 
a complementary policy mix covering, but not limited to, interest rate, exchange rate, and trade.
Th   e results on the indirect linkages furthermore suggest the importance of solid macro-organiza-
tional foundation. Countries must therefore have policies to strengthen the institutional eﬀ  ectiveness of the 
government, covering ﬁ  nancial governance and administrative capacity. It entails the development of the 
ﬁ  nancial sector through, for instance, deepening of banking and capital markets. It is important to have a 
ﬁ  nancial system that is able to mobilize funds and a capital market that facilitates the transfer of internal and 
external savings to support capital accumulation in the country. In addition, it is important to have a robust 
and competitive real sector that produces goods and services both for the domestic and global markets, at the 
same time, production that is progressively upgrading on the industrial ladder.
Obviously, the above points complement each other. Th   e government must be brought back to the 
centre stage of public policy. In the management of the macro economy, the government must emphasize 
domestic responsibility, especially in setting economic goals and a vision of economic development. In addi-
tion, the government must choose policies that reﬂ  ect domestic characteristics and contexts (e.g., choosing 
an appropriate monetary policy to encourage domestic investment). It must also be embedded in society to 
be able to respond to domestic challenges, including the provision of social safety nets; yet remain autono-
mous so it can also withstand external challenges that are counter-productive to realizing robust economic 
performance and strengthening macro-organizational fundamentals (e.g., putting restraints on speculative 
capital ﬂ  ows, managing external borrowing, and monitoring economic activities, especially unproductive 
ones). Likewise, the government must promote and enable relationships to support the realization of macro-
economic and macro-organization goals (e.g., enabling and allowing government-business cooperation and 
more meaningful participation of civil society). 26  DESA Working Paper No. 16
Th   e results reinforce the importance of eﬀ  ective domestic and international involvement and coor-
dination in the management of capital ﬂ  ows. If external borrowing ﬂ  ows out as capital ﬂ  ight, and if capital 
surges bring about ﬁ  nancial and economic fragility, increased risk, or reduced eﬀ  ectiveness of macroeco-
nomic policies, there is a need to intervene and institute some form of capital ﬂ  ow management (see, e.g., 
Epstein, Grabel and Jomo, 2003; Chang and Grabel, 2004). But the goal for intervention is not to revert to 
ﬁ  nancial repression—it is to regain control over macroeconomic policies and the direction of development 
in general. Such tools and related techniques would enable developing countries to retain (as well as attract) 
capital in the domestic economy, and to use the capital towards achieving sustained economic growth and 
development. For example, capital management techniques can be used to direct capital ﬂ  ows to the trad-
able or productive sectors to bring about sustainable industrialization and push the economy to a higher 
level of production; they can also be used to aﬀ  ect the volume and composition of capital formation. Indeed, 
economic deregulation, ﬁ  nancial liberalization, and globalization, and the processes that go with them also 
imply that the institutions for governance and the mechanism for administrative controls and regulations are 
most needed and have to be in place (and should therefore be enhanced) in order to realize a smooth adjust-
ment process. Th   is goal is especially important to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Th  ailand  today.
Finally, the results reinforce the importance of eﬀ  ective domestic and international involvement 
and coordination in the management of capital ﬂ  ows. If external borrowing ﬂ  ows out as capital ﬂ  ight, and if 
capital surges bring about ﬁ  nancial and economic fragility, increased risk, or reduced eﬀ  ectiveness of mac-
roeconomic policies, there is a need to intervene and institute some form of capital ﬂ  ow management (see, 
e.g., Epstein, Grabel and Jomo, 2003; Chang and Grabel, 2004). Th   e goal for intervention is not to revert to 
ﬁ  nancial repression—it is to regain control over macroeconomic policies and the direction of development 
in general. Such tools and related techniques would enable developing countries to retain (as well as attract) 
capital in the domestic economy, and to use the capital towards achieving sustained economic growth and 
development. For example, capital management techniques can be used to direct capital ﬂ  ows to the tradable 
or productive sectors to bring about sustainable industrialization and push the economy to a higher level of 
production; they can also be used to aﬀ  ect the volume and composition of capital formation. Indeed, eco-
nomic deregulation, ﬁ  nancial liberalization, and globalization, and the processes that go with them also imply 
that the institutions for governance and the mechanism for administrative controls and regulations are most 
needed and have to be in place (and should therefore be enhanced) in order to realize a smooth adjustment 
process. Th   is goal is especially important to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Th  ailand  today.
Final thoughts
Th   is paper has analyzed the reasons why capital was ﬂ  eeing Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Th  ai-
land by employing a revolving door model of capital ﬂ  ight. Two kinds of explanations were presented: 
indirect and direct linkages between capital ﬂ  ight and external debt. Th  e  ﬁ  rst explanation posits that there 
are indirect linkages between capital ﬂ  ight and external debt, holding that capital ﬂ  ight and external borrow-
ing occur because of exogenous factors independent of each other. For example, macroeconomic mismanage-
ment creates a risky and uncertain economic environment, and capital ﬂ  ight is a response to such conditions. 
In the same fashion, macroeconomic mismanagement creates conditions that lead to even more external 
borrowing. And external debt can arise from corruption and related factors. It was pointed out that such 
explanations cannot account for the close year-to-year correlation between capital ﬂ  ight and external borrow-
ing. While the second explanation posits direct linkages between external debt (capital inﬂ  ows) and capital 
ﬂ  ight, holding that external debt (capital inﬂ  ows) provides the fuel and/or motivation for capital ﬂ  ight, Revisiting the Revolving Door: Capital Flight from Southeast Asia  27
and vice versa. For instance, external borrowing can be transformed from a capital inﬂ  ow to capital ﬂ  ight 
that ends up in some private account abroad; capital inﬂ  ows have “liquidity” eﬀ  ects. Moreover, as external 
debt accumulates, the mounting burden of debt service and the possibility of a default provide a signal for 
increased economic (or country) risk, to which capital holders respond by pulling out their capital from the 
country; thus, total external debts have “stock” eﬀ  ects. Furthermore, capital ﬂ  ight from a country can re-en-
ter the same country in the form of external borrowing, spinning the revolving door pattern. As capital ﬂ  ight 
continues, the country will experience a reduction in available resources and be forced to incur external debt 
to replenish lost funds. Th   en the following seven hypotheses were tested: 
Hypothesis 1:   High rates of return to capital within a country lower capital ﬂ  ight.
Hypothesis 2:  High and sustained economic growth within a country reduces capital ﬂ  ight. 
Hypothesis 3:  Deregulation and ﬁ  nancial liberalization increase both capital ﬂ  ight and 
   external  borrowing.
Hypothesis 4:  An increase in capital inﬂ  ows from external borrowing increases capital ﬂ  ight 
   (debt-fueled  capital  ﬂ  ight).
Hypothesis 5:  Higher stock of external indebtedness increases capital ﬂ  ight 
   (debt-driven  capital  ﬂ  ight).
Hypothesis 6:   An increase in capital ﬂ  ight increases external borrowing (ﬂ  ight-fueled borrowing).
Hypothesis 7:   An increase in the stock of capital ﬂ  ight decreases international reserves and 
   increases  external  borrowing  (ﬂ  ight-driven borrowing).
Th   e results conﬁ  rm the fourth and ﬁ  fth hypotheses in the list. Th   e results also conﬁ  rm the sixth and seventh 
hypotheses, but in the case of Malaysia, ﬂ  ight-driven debt was not conﬁ  rmed. Th   erefore, we conclude that 
external debt fuels capital ﬂ  ight (and vice versa) and increased indebtedness drives capital ﬂ  ight. 
Th   e results likewise conﬁ  rm the ﬁ  rst and second hypotheses. In particular, indicators for economic 
performance and the rates of return to capital show that the indirect determinants are relevant to Southeast 
Asia. In particular, robust economic growth or positive interest rate diﬀ  erentials, or both, would reduce 
capital ﬂ  ight. Th   erefore the results conﬁ  rm that there are indirect linkages between external borrowing and 
capital ﬂ  ight. But economic performance can have diﬀ  erent impacts on external borrowing, depending on 
the speciﬁ  c country context.
Th   e results for policy dummies for deregulation and ﬁ  nancial liberalization, and their interaction 
with capital ﬂ  ight and external debt, lend more support to our results for the direct linkages (particularly, 
the “fuel” type linkages), but again, depending on the speciﬁ  c country context. Th   is result conﬁ  rms the third 
hypothesis. It also reinforces our ﬁ  ndings on the revolving process of external borrowing and capital ﬂ  ight. 
Even from a qualitative juxtaposition of the data from historical events in Southeast Asia, it can be 
concluded that trends in capital ﬂ  ight are linked to some extent to either economic or political shocks, or 
both. Similarly, the trends are linked to policy changes, thus again the results conﬁ  rm the third hypothesis. 
Putting the results together, it can be concluded that the revolving door nature of capital ﬂ  ight is a 
critical dimension to understanding how capital scarcity, external indebtedness, and consequently, the cur-28  DESA Working Paper No. 16
tailment of economic growth, aﬀ  ect the sustained development of Southeast Asia. But in general, when de-
veloping countries are already lagging behind on the economic ladder, capital ﬂ  ight pulls them further down. 
Th   is concern also applies to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Th   ailand. In a way, capital ﬂ  ight kicks 
away the ladder of economic growth and development. Perhaps it is time to revisit the importance of having 
decisive policies to strengthen macroeconomic management and macro-organizational fundamentals, and to 
move away from unfettered capital ﬂ  ows.Revisiting the Revolving Door: Capital Flight from Southeast Asia  29
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